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CHINA'S NEW STRENGTH
At Cairo, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek took part in a joint
decision by the great powers on the treatment of a defeated Japan.
This decision, to strip Japan of all territorial gains since 1895
and to return to China her lost territories, means that the other
powers expect China to replace Japan as the strongest Asiatic
nation. Her partnership is recognized as essential in the execution
of the military plans adopted at Cairo for the defeat of Japan.
In the future, China will be counted on as one of the chief
guardians of peace in the Pacific basin.
To Americans this is a natural and welcome development, the
logical climax, indeed, to a hundred years of American Far Eastern policy. While China has achieved her new status by her own
efiorts, Americans like to think that they have helped in the
process. American teachers and technicians have aided China in
building up her own strength, and the policy of the United States
government has consistently been directed toward preserving
and strengthening the territorial ir.tegdty and political independence of China.
The fact that China now takes her rightful place among the
great nations of the world does not mean, however, that all her
problems are solved. On the contrary, the greater the nation, the
greater its problems and responsibilities. This has been recognized by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in a message to the
nation:
By the abolition of the unequal treaties, our national responsibilities have only been increased. We should meet the new
responsibilities with a still keener resolve to do our duty.
After the war China will face domestic problems of truly herculean proportions. The mere job of physical reconstruction in
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war-torn areas is staggering. But China is not content merely to
rebuild on the old basis. She intends to go forward, continuing
the process of modernizing her 4,000-year-old civilization which
was so rudely interrupted by Japanese attack. She intends to
build up her industrial and military strength for purposes of
self-defense and to fulfill her new role as a great power. Her
ancient civilization, based on land and human labor, must be
transformed into a new civilization based on the machine. In this
process, social and political conflicts will inevitably arise. The
Chinese revolution, begun in 1911 with the overthrow of the
Manchu dynasty and carried a long step forward with the
triumph of the Kuomintang in 1927, is yet far from completed.
CHINA FIGHTS IN SPITE OF INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES

Today, in her seventh year of war, and in spite of her new
international recognition, China's internal position is perhaps
more difficult than ever before in her modern history. Failure
to appreciate this has led to confusion in the minds of many
Americans. We have been filled with admiration at the way in
which the people of China, in the face of almost incredible hardships and disappointments, have stood up to the Japanese year
after year without giving in. When Japan attacked in 1937, few
people thought that China had a chance of successful resistance.
Most observers expected her to yield without a serious struggle.
W hen she did stand and fight, nea rly everyone predicted that she
would be beaten within a month. But to the amazement and
admiration of the world, China did not collapse. On the contrary,
her people seemed to find in war greater strength and unity than
they had ever found in peace.
As months and years passed and China remained u nconquered,
people in the Western world endowed the Chinese with almost
superh uman qualities. We began to talk of the "unbeatable
Chinese" and to rank China as a great military power, only
slightly below Britain and Russia. T he events following Pearl
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Harbor seemed lO confirm this picture. The devastating defeats
which we suaered at the hands of Japan taught us a new respect for Japan's military machine. The fact that China had
apparently stopped this machine while the Western powers were
unable to do so increased our respect for China's prowess. So a
sort of myth grew up of Chinese invincibility and indestructibility. China, we assured ourselves, could "take it" indefinitely. And
since China is fighting on our side against totalitarian Japan, we
naturally came to think of her as one of the great democraciesthe one country on which we could rely for democratic leadership
in post-war Asia.
WISHFUL THINKING VS. UNDERSTANDING CHINA

Yet in this idealized picture of China there was much ignorance
and wishful thinking. It did not correspond to the facts any more
than our previous picture of China as weak, backward and supine.
It is just as serious to overestimate China's capacity as to underestimate it. Nor does it help China if we expect her to do the
impossible. For the miracle of Chinese resistance-and it is
miraculous-has not been accomplished without a price. China
has suffered tremendous losses in men and materials. Her people
have undergone physical hardships almost inconceivable to us.
Not least i~ the psychological strain of seven years of unremitting
warfare, with the hope of large-scale aid from her allies still
unfulfilled. China's development as a modern nation-so vigorous and promising in 1937-has undergone severe setbacks, both
economic and political. Social stresses and strains, accentuated
by war-time uncertainty and dislocation, have shown themselves
in dissension on the home front.
If the facts about war-time China do not correspond with the
rosy picture in the minds of many Americans, they are not wholly
to blame. Because of censorship, the difficulties of war-time
transport, and the temptation to idealize a gallant ally, comparatively little information is available to the public on recent de-
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velopments inside China. And much of what we do hear is contradictory.
On the one side, we hear that great progress has been made
toward political unity and toward the economic development of
the areas controlled by the Chungking government. We hear
that the brutal Japanese attack has aroused Chinese of all walks
of life to patriotic endeavor such as China has never seen before.
The fighting qualities of the Chinese have been dramatized in
the ahnost legendary exploits of her guerrilla warriors. And the
recent fixing of a prospective date for ratification of the Draft
Constitution seems to promise greater democracy than China has
ever known.
On the other side, we hear rumors of threatened civil war, of
inOation and economic breakdown, of profiteering and chiseling
-with which we are not unfamiliar in this country-and of military incapacity. One of our leading military experts has described
the Chinese troops as "poorly led and incapable of effectively
utilizing modern arms." Other qualified observers have asserted
that the domestic policies of the Chungking government are becoming increasingly reactionary, and that there is little likelihood
of a genuine democracy being developed by the present leadership.
#

As is so often the case with conflicting reports, there is a great
deal of truth in all of these stories. There is evidence of genuine
and hopeful progress in China; there is also evjdence of deterioration and reaction. Many of the gains and losses seem to
balance each other. But underneath these surface events, a profound ferment is going on in China which may shape the future
not only of China but of all Asia. Our war strategy and our postwar policies will be affected by what happens in China. Hence it
is important that we examine her problems realistically and
sympathetically, in order to get as clear a picture as we can of
the conflicting tendencies which exist today. For unless we understand the possibilities of China, our plans for a secure peace in
the Pacific are in jeopardy.
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CHINA'S WAR-TIME ACHIEVEMENTS
As a first step in this understanding, it might be well to gain
an appreciation of China's truly remarkable military resistance.
When the Japanese first invaded Manchuria and North China
in 1931-32, the Chinese put up very little effective opposition. It
is true that the 19th Route Army did put up a spectacular fight
at Shanghai in the winter of 1932. But it received virtually no
aid from the National Government troops under Chiang Kaishek. For a few weeks after Japan opened her attack in North
China in 1937, it looked as jf history would repeat itself. Although
some Chinese troops fought bravely at Tientsin and at Nankow
Pass, north of Peiping, the Japanese encountered little difficulty
in overrunning most of North China. It was not unLil fighting
broke out at Shanghai some weeks later that it became certain
that the main body of government troops in Central and South
China would resist. But once the Shanghai battle got under
way, it was clear that this time Chiang Kai-shek would fightthat there would be no more efiorts at appeasement.
For nearly a year and a half- that js, until the fall of Hankow
in October 1938-there was severe fighting. Both Chinese and
Japanese casualties were heavy. During this period the Chinese
won at least one spectacular victory. This occurred at Taierchwang, Shantung, in April 1938, when the Chinese stlrrounded
a large Japanese detachment, forcing it to retreat with heavy
losses. Most of the Chinese triumphs, however, were defensive in
nature. The Japanese ultimately seized whatever territory they
wanted, but they often had to pay dearly for their conquests.
With the fall of Hankow and Canton the Chinese freely
~bandoned a fixed defense of cities and towns. Recognizing their
mferiority in planes, tanks, guns and all other types of modern
equipment, they began to fight a war of movement and attrition
9

rather than attempting the defense of strong points. Fighting
became less heavy. Losses in killed and wounded were lighter.
But resistance continued. And though the Japanese were usually
able to march where they wished, they were frequently surrounded and cut off and they suffered several serious setbacks.
They were not able to destroy the Chinese armies.
SERIOUS DEFICIENCY OF SUPPLIES, SUPPLY ROUTES

From a military standpoint, the remarkable thing is that the
Chinese were able to maintain resistance in the face of great inferiority of arms and supplies of all kinds. Comparatively little
help has been obtained from abroad. After the loss of Canton in
1938, there were only four routes by which supplies could reach
China from friendly foreign countries: (1) a rail line through
French Indo-China to Kunming; (2) the long overland route
from Russia; (3) later, the newly constructed road over the
mountains to Burma; and (4) smuggling through Hongkong.
Following the fall of France in 1940, the Japanese induced the
French to stop shipments through Indo-China. The Soviet Union
continued to send assistance on a fairly large scale until it was
attacked by Germany in 1941, but little has come in from Russia
since that time. Japanese seizure of Hongkong on Christmas Day,
1941, and the closing of the Burma Road in May 1942, cut the
last overland routes to China, leaving the precarious air route
over the eastern end of the Himalayas as the sole means of getting
foreign supplies into the country.*
As a result of being thus almost completely cut off from the
outside world, the Chinese armies have had to fight with practically no air support, no heavy artillery, no armored equipment,
and even without adequate transport equipment. Worst of all, in
many respects, has been the shortage of drugs and medical supplies. The wounded have not received adequate c2re, and hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers have been rendered unfit
• Until the opening of the Ledo Road in 1945.-Eo.
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for duty by cholera, typhus, plague, malaria and tuberculosis. In
the past few years the military losses from preventable sickness
have been much greater than the losses incurred in battle. Yet
despite these handicaps, Chinese resistance has gone on. No other
country has ever fought so long with so little against such overwhelming odds.
This res.istance would have been impossible had the war not
brought important gains on the industrial, governmental and
political fronts. These gains were not as clear-cut as Chinese
propagandists would have us believe. evertheless, they are significant enough to deserve our attention.
WAR-TIME ECONOMIC PROGRESS

China's achievements on the economic front are particularly
remarkable when it is remembered that the areas taken over by
Japan contained nearly all of the country's pre-war industry, railroads, navigable rivers, roads, and most of it; skilled workers.
Moreover, such industry as China possessed before the war was
chieAy devoted to the manufacture of light consumers' goods. She
turned out a fair amount of textiles and cigarettes. But there was
virtually no heavy industry. Nor were there factories capable of
conversion to the production of tanks, guns or airplanes. Her
military arsenals were equipped only for the production of small
arms and ammunition, and most of these fell quickly into Japanese hands.
Some of China's achievements in developing industry in the
areas remaining under Chungking's control are shrouded in
military secrecy. But enough is known to give a general picture
of the present situation. We know, for example, that a total of
472 factories with machinery totaling 70,900 tons were removed
from Shanghai, Hongkong and other war zones into the interior.
T hese factories took w.ith them 12,160 of the original workmen.
It is difficult to say just what proportion of China's pre-war industry was thus removed from the coastal areas. T hat it was a

11

fairly small proportion may be seen from the fact that there were
only 170,000 cotton spindles operating in Free China in 1941 and
245,000 in 1942 as against 3,000,000 in pre-war China. Most of the
remainder were destroyed. Possibly .500,000 spindles escaped destruction and fell into Japanese hands.
In other fields China's present production compares somewhat
more favorably w.ith pre-war output. Coal production in Free
China in 1942 is estimated at 6,000,000 tons as agai nst 5,000,JOO in 1941. In the last pre-war year, 1936, coal output for the
whole of China was 22,250,000 tons. Before the war there was
comparatively little production of industrial alcohol, diesel oil
or gasoline from native vegetable oils. In 1942 more than 9,000,000
gallons of these liquid fuels were produced, which helped to relieve the severe shortage of gasoline. Iron production, although
extremely small by our standards, has increased fivefold since
1940; steel output has risen by 50 per cent; machine-spun cotton
yarn has jumped threefold; and the chemical industry has made
substantial progress. The .interior province of Yunnan has a small
but modern and efficiently run machine works which produces
turbogenerator sets, boilers, gas engines, machine tools and textile machinery.
INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVES
Whi1e most of the industrial development in Free China has
been carried out either by privately-owned plants or by government enterprises, a very considerable amount of production has
been achieved in the most remote sections of the country by a
unique movement known as the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives.
The cooperatives were organized in 1938 under the leadership of
a Shanghai factory inspector, a New Zealander named Rewi
Alley. They were peculiarly suited to the desperate conditions in
China following the loss of. the last of the old industria l areas,
those of Canton and Hankow. At that time Free China was almost wholly without capita l for industrial development. Large12
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scale industry was imp ractical because of the lack of machinery
and the danger of Japanese bombing. But there was an abundant
supply of labor, and small amounts of raw materials were available locally in many parts of China.
Under the leadership of the industrial cooperative movement
small groups of workers have been encouraged to set up small
local industries. Very little capital is required since the tools and
machines used are of the simplest type and most of the raw materials are obtained locally. The cooperatives are set up in caves,
farmhouses and deserted temples. Although each unit is small,
the total production is impressive. In the middle of 1942 the
monthly production of 1,600 cooperative societies that had been
set up was estimated at $24,000,000 in Chinese currency. Altogether some 500 different items are manufactured by the cooperatives, including such things as woolen blankets, uniforms,
shoes, raincoats, gunpowder, medical supplies, spinning wheels,
looms, wrought iron, plows, printing presses, flour mills, foundry
equipment, clothing, foodstuffs and household articles. Recently
they have undertaken to produce articles for the United States
Army as well as for the Chinese Army. The cooperatives also
carry out an extensive educational program and have done much
to raise the economic and cultural level of many remote villages
in China's far interior.

BIRTH OF POLITICAL UNITY
During the first two or three years of the war, Chinese political
unity was strengthened materially. The Japanese attack caused
all political groups to subordinate their immediate interests and
rally to the support of the National Government. Chiang Kaishek, as leader of the resistance, became the symbol of a united
China. War lords who had fought against him for years pledged
their support to his government. Many Chinese who had regarded Chiang as little more than a modern version of the old
war lords similarly rallied behind him. A truce was reached in
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the long struggle between Chiang and the Communists, with
both agreeing to cooperate m the common war against Japan.
Remote Sinkiang, formrrly known as Chinese Turkestan, has
been brought under National Government control for the first
time in many years. For a time even 'the tiny band of appeasers
associated with Wang Ching-wei supported the National Government. So universal was the support for Chiang Kai-shek that
Japan had great difficulty in finding any Chinese politician to
head the puppet government which she had planned to set up.
Finally Wang Ching-wei was persuaded to become the Chinese
Quisling, but he was able to attract very little support.
AGE-OLD DIVISIONS SUBORDINATED

To us, such patriotic rallying to the national standard is no
more than we should expect in a country which had been invaded by as brutal an enemy as Japan. But it must be remembered
I
that China had never really been united since the days of the
Manchu empire. Because family ties had always come first in
Chinese thinking, only the educated and most advanced Chinese
possessed national consciousness and deep patriotic feeling. The
enemies of China had repeatedly taken advantage of China's
sectional divisions to gain their ends. The Japanese, never very
original in their tactics, had good reason to believe that they
could gain support from Chiang Kai-shek's enemies by such
time-honored methods as bribery and promises of power, which
would make it unnecessary to crush him by military force.
Moreover, the Japanese had a stronger political weapon than
most of us realize in asserting that their chief goal was the destruction of the white man's power in the Orient. For nearly
twenty years the Chinese had been carrying on a struggle against
Western imperialism. But they had not fully succeeded in ridding
themselves of the unequal treaties or other marks of white ascendancy. In Manchuria, the Japanese had succeeded in freezing out
British and American trade without being challenged. After the
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attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese scored a series of decisive
victories over the British, Americans and Dutch. These victories
did not pass unnoticed in China. It cannot be denied that some
Chinese were impressed when the Japanese argued that their
main purpose was to rid Asia of white imperialism. While few
prominent Chinese have actively cooperated with the Japanese,
it is probably fair to say that a number of the Chinese leaders
have always resented Western encroachments more than those
of Japan.
UNITY FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION

Against this historical background, the degree of national
unity that has been achieved in China since 1937 under Chiang
Kai-shek's leadership is truly remarkable. Without it, the
"miracle" of military resistance could not have taken place. The
idea of a national struggle for national liberation has not only
strengthened the morale of soldiers and civilians. It has also had
a practical effect in bringing about cooperation between Chinese
generals and local leaders, who in the past have tended to be
very independent. It has made it possible to strengthen the power
of the National Government in coordinating the nation's war
effort. It has meant that a province such as Szechwan, which for
years had been virtually independent of the National Government, has put itself under Chiang Kai-shek's orders. It has meant
that new roads could be built, airfields developed, and military
measures taken without which continued resistance against Japan
would be impossible.
This process has not only aided the war effort, but has had
more lasting effects as well. It has greatly strengthened the National Government not only against Japan but also against the
local provincial war lords. It has brought new funds into the
national treasury. And it has contributed substantially to the economic and social development of the interior provinces. In effect,
it has brought some of them from the Middle Ages into the
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twentieth century within a span of on ly a few years. Many parts
of the country that were extremely backward before 1937-some
without wheeled vehicles of any kind-now possess airfields and
at least some modern industrial plants. And with modern machinery there have come modern ideas-ideas that have strengthened China in the face of the enemy.
Among the ideas that have spread in China as a result of the
war are those associated with democracy. In some respects China
has always been a democratic country. Americans living .in China
have always been impressed by the free and easy way in which
Chinese of all classes and occupations laugh and talk with one
another. Chinese coolies and peasants show little of the attitude
of servility that is found in other Oriental countries. In theory
and to some extent in practice, the son of the coolie or the farmer
always could, if he possessed unusual ability, rise to become a
scholar or government official. Since the overthrow of the
Manchus, there has been no hereditary aristocracy. The old
Chinese custom of having officials chosen by examination rather
than through political influence was essentially democratic in
operation. While it did not give the people the power to choose
their ru lers, it did open the way, to some extent, for men of all
ranks to rise to power.
STEPS TOWARD DEMOCRACY

The goal of Chinese progressives since the overthrow of the
Manchus in 1911 has been the creation of a modern democratic
state modeled after the United States and the French Republic.
In its early days the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, strongly
opposed the anti-democratic rule of Yuan Shih-kai and the war
lords of the 1920's. But despite China's democratic habits, Sun
Yat-sen and other revolutionary leaders recognized that the
people as a whole were not ready for self-rule. Only a small fraction of the adult population could read or write. There were no
traditions of voting either by ballot, by town meeting or sov.iet,
17

or by any other clear-cut means of expressing the popular will.
Recognizing this, Sun Yat-sen, the father of modern China, proposed a period of tutelage during which the people . would be
prepared gradually for self-rule. During this period of tutelage
the full responsibilities of government were to rest in the hands
of the Nationalist Par~y or Kuomintang. Although Sun Yat-sen
seems to have thought of this period as being a relatively short
one, it has been in effect since the establishment of the Nationalist
Government in 1927.
Just before the outbreak of war in 1937, a new constitution was
prepared which was to serve as the basis for a constitutional,
democratic government. The draft of the proposed new constitution was published on May 5, 1936, and plans were set up for
summoning a People's Congress in November 1937 to ratify the
constitution and set a date for putting it into effect. The war intervened, however, and for several years the entire project was
shelved.
THE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL COUNCIL

Agitation for a more representative form of government was
stimulated by the social and political awakening that accompanied the war. In response to this growing popular pressure, the
Nationalist Government took its first step toward democracy
when it set up, in 1938, a People's Political Council. The Council
has only advisory powers. None of its 200 members is elected by
popular vote, and half of those appointed are Kuomintang members. Nevertheless, it has served a genuinely democratic function.
By drawing jn individuals from difierent political groups and
representatives from non-government agencies, the Council has
aided to some extent in keeping the government aware of popular
thinking. And its existence as a forum for the discussion of national policies has constituted a brake on dictatorial actions by
the government. In some instances its proposals have been accepted by the government, and although its influence has been
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necessari ly limited, it has been generally exerted in a progressive
direction.
The prospects for an early realization of Sun Yat-sen's dream of
constitutional government in China were further advanced in
September 1943, when the Central Executive Committee of the
Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, voted to summon a People's
Congress no later than one year after the war to ratify the Draft
Constitution. Although this action merely provided for carrying
out plans that had been made in 1936, it was nevertheless good
news to the progressive groups in China, which had been urging
more rapid progress in introducing democratic institutions. A few
months earlier, reports from Chungking had indicated that the
Kuomintang leaders had determined to postpone the establishment of a constitutional government for some years after the
close of hostilities. In announcing the new decisions, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek declared that after the constitution was
adopted, the Kuomintang would take its place on an equal footing with such other political parties as might develop. He pledged
that all parties would have equal treatment with respect to freedom of assembly, organization, speech and publication.
CRITICISM OF DRAFT CONSTITUTION

Many Chinese are not satisfied with the D raft Constitution,
however, regarding it as unwieldy and undemocratic. For example, it provides for a People's Congress of about 2,000 members
which is to meet for one month every three years. Members of
the People's Political Council have proposed that this be s11pplemented by a Political Assembly of some 200 members, meeting
every six months, which could exert a more direct popular control over the executive branch of the government.
Another war-time step toward democracy has been the promulgation of a system of self-government for the hsims or counties
of China. A program was drawn up in August 1939 by a group
of government experts called together by the Ministry of Interior.
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Hsien assemblies have been set up in more than half of the hsiens
in the country. These assemblies are composed of representatives
indirectly elected by groups of ten, a hundred, or a thousand
families in villages and towns, together with representation from
professional organizations. The assemblies do not appoint the
local magistrates, but they have general supervision of local
budgetary matters. Even this modest start toward local self-government is important in a country like China where administrative matters have always been decided from above. Critics assert,
however, that this system of representation is unnatural and cumbersome and that in practice the so-called self-governing bodies
have been dominated by the landlords and merchants. Real selfgovernment, even in the villages and country districts, is still
far from being achieved.

PUT YOURSELF IN CHIN ESE BOOTS

When measured against the handicaps which she has had to
overcome, China's war effort is truly impressive. Try to imagine
that an enemy power has occupied both seacoasts of the United
States and most of the country east of the Mississippi. The capital
has been moved to Denver and is flooded with refugees. Then
take away nearly all of the factories, railroads, highways, telephone and telegraph lines, electrical equipment, coal, iron and
oil fields from the unoccupied area. Even so, we should be better
off than China for we should still have an abundance of skilled
labor and trained technicians and administrators. For the political
picture, go back to 1776 when our country consisted of thirteen
"sovereign" states with hardly any organized national government, and plenty of conservatives who saw no sense in fighting
for that new and unfamiliar idea, the "United States of America."
Keep up the enemy pressure for seven years with little help from
outside. That might give you a rough idea, in American terms,
of what China has been up against.
If you can picture America in any such plight, you can imagine

20

MA C HI N£

SHOP
OVER

IN

J000

C H UNGKI NG,

ONE

OF

H UN DRE DS OF

FACTORI ES

TRA"S P ORTE D

MIL ES FROM C OASTAL RE GI ON S T O CHI N A' S INT ERIOR.

also that the picture of conditions in "Free America" after seven
years would not be bright. And there is, indeed, a darker side to
the picture of war-time China. It is disturbing to friends of
China, but it is not surprising, nor does it cause any real misgivings as to China's future among those who know her people and
believe in their practical sense and their democratic spirit.
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OBSTACLES TO CHINA'S WAR EFFORT
We may as well recognize that China is not fighting a "total
war," in the sense that Britain is, for example. For that matter,
neither is the United States. Chinese as well as foreign critics
have pointed out that her war effort still falls far short of the
fullest possible mobilization of the country's human and material
resources. There is plenty of inefficiency and "chiseling" .in wartime China, and some graft. As in America, there are still individuals who put their own .interests above those of the nation.
More disturbing is the evidence that China has actually lost
ground since the beginning of the war on both the economic and
the political fronts. While this is perhaps only to be expected after
seven years of grinding effort, it raises serious probleMs affecting
the future of China after the war. China is not as strong, either
economically or politically, as she was in 1937. The drain on her
resources has been too great. We must grasp this fact if we are
to discharge our obligations as friends and allies of the Chinese
people.
INFLATION

The heavy economic price which China has paid for her resistance to Japan may be seen most clearly in the inflation which
has the entire country in its grip. Prices have mounted to fantastic
levels and are steadily rising at a rate of at least 10 per cent a
month. By the beginning of 1944 the average citizen of Chungking was paying more than 200 times as much for food, clothing
and other essentials as before the war. The price of some manufactured goods had increased 500-fold. Although the rise in prices
started in the early days of the war, it was aggravated after the
loss of Canton and the cutting of the Burma Road by the shortage
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of all kinds of imported goods and supplies. When goods are
short and hard to get, money, which can be printed anywhere,
loses its value and prices are bound to skyrocket.
At first the only persons to suffer seriously from the inflation
were foreigners, teachers, government officials and Army officers
-all of whom are dependent on fixed salaries. College professors
were perhaps hit the hardest. Early in 1943 it was estimated that
the salaries of full professors in the Chinese universities, despite
some increase, had a purchasing power only about one-twentieth
as great as their pre-war salaries. In contrast, coolies, skilled workers and farmers sufiered little, if at all, during the first few years
of inflation. Wages increased to keep pace with the rising cost of
living, while farmers benefited from higher prices for their crops.
By the end of 1942, however, all groups in the population were
beginning to feel the pinch. The universal shortage of goods and
the efforts of the government to control the rising prices had led
to a growing economic paralysis. Except for a few kinds of skilled
labor, wages had fallen behind the rise in living costs. Farmers
were beginning to find that prices of the things that they needed,
few as they were, had mounted more than the prices they received
for their crops. Only the speculators profited, while many small
farmers lost their lands.
More serious from the standpoint of the war effort was the
fact that industrial production and construction had begun to
slow down. Manufacturers who had made contracts with the
government found that owing to the constant increase in prices
of raw materials and labor they could not afford to fulfill their
contracts. They found it more profitable to hoard and speculate
jn raw materials than to turn them into finished goods. As a result, nearly a fifth of the small factories in the Chungking area
were not operating in the early months of 1944. Mineral output
had also been cut drastically, and because of the extremely high
costs of transportation, most construction, including the building
of new industry, had come to a standstill.
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POOR PLANNING

Nor was inflation the only factor interfering with China's war
production. Behind the inflation and partially responsible for it
was poor planning by the government. The outstanding weakness
in the Chinese war economy is to be found in its extreme dependence on imports from abroad. This defect is recognized, although not publicized, by most Chinese industrial and political
leaders. As early as 1942, Chou Mou-pei, an important Chungking
industrialist, predicted "the total collapse of the machine industry
in the interior" because of a dependence on imported parts. He
urged a change in basic policy which would make China more
self-sufficient in raw materials and war supplies.
An analysis of such production figures as are available shows
that really very little has been done in more than six years of war
ro build up the basic war industries. We find, for example, that
the total steel production jn 1942 was only about 1 0,000 tons. Of
course, it would be unfair to compare this with the 90,000,000
tons turned out annually in the United States. Yet competent
authorities believe that by making use of small village industries
as well as what large-scale facilities there are, China could ir:.crease its iron and steel production several times. But without
an over-all plan for war production, such an increase would be
futile. Actually, according to one of China's leading newspapers,
the Ta Kung Pao, "the iron and steel industry at present produces more than consumers can buy." Commenting further on
the inadequacy of industrial pb.nning in war-time China, the
Ta Kung Pao adds:
A sound plan for industrial development has been lacking so
far. Although government enterprises have achieved considerable results, it is open to discussion whether there is sufficient
planning for the future. Private industries are being developed
without rational planning in relation to existing communications and raw material supplies.
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SPECULATION

It has been charged that the economic policies of the government have had the effect of encouraging people with money to
use it in speculation and profiteering instead of investing it in
war industry. Hence, it is said, China's resources are not being
used as fully as they might be for war production. This charge is
partly confirmed by no less a person than Chiang Kai-shek himself. Speaking before the Second Production Conference in
Chungking in the summer of 1943, the Generalissimo urged that
idle capital be used for production "instead of being allowed to
circulate in other fields according to changing market conditions."
The Ta Kung Pao echoed the same complaint when it declared
that commercial speculation was "absorbing a large part of the
available capital." lL then went on to make a statement which
gives a key to the l'nderstanding of China's war-time economic
difficulties. In the search for riches, it declares, Chinese "merchants are ... becoming landlords, while the landlords are .
becoming merchants, and neither of them wants to invest m
industrial enterprises."
To understand why this has happened, it is necessary to remember that China has lost her seaports, her industrial cities, and
most of her contacts with the outside world. The new, modern
China that was beginning to grow up before the war was based
on the port cities. When Nanking, Shanghai, Canton, Hankow
and Hongkong fell into the hands of the enemy, the bankers,
merchants and industrialists who had founded modern business
establishments in the cities either stayed behind and fell into
the hands of the Japanese, were killed, or lost their property to
the enemy. With this class of modern, forward-looking business
men largely out of the picture, financial leadership in present-day
China has passed into the hands of those whose wealth lay in the
interior, chiefly large landowners and merchants. This group does
not have the modern traditions of the port cities. It has its roots
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in China's centuries-old system of land-ownership and is chiefly
interested in perpetuating that system.
FARM PROBLEMS
As in all Oriental countries, Chinese society has from ancient
times been based on the land and on a system of landownership
which seems oppressive by modern standards. Comparatively little
has been heard in this country regarding the problem of sharecropping and farm tenancy in China. Some writers have even suggested that it is not a serious problem. To support this statement
they quote the estimate of a well-known American authority on
China, Lossing Buck, to the efiect that the landlords control
30 to 70 per cent of the land, a proportion that is not much higher
than in many other countries.
The truth is that the tenancy problem varies considerably in
different parts of China. In some sections, chiefly North China,
most of the land is owned by those who farm it. But in other
areas, including a large part of what is now Free China, most of
the land is controlled by absentee landlords. The rents charged
in these areas are extremely high, amounting to half or more of
the total crop. Moreover, the landlords, moneylenders and merchants often work together to maintain this highly exploitative
share-cropping system by making small loans at extremely high
rates of interest and thus keeping the peasants constantly in debt.
Naturally, this combination has great political as well as economic power in the areas where it is dominant.
INFLATION MULTIPLIES DIFFICULTIES
I nflation and the accompanying wave of speculation have
probably increased this power, since this group alone has had
idle money to use for hoarding and speculation. And to complete
the vicious circle, this increased power has been used, according
to the Ta Kung Pao, to prevent the Chinese government from
instituting the bold policies necessary to stimulate production and
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-bring inflation under control, thus obstructing the effective
prosecution of the war. Some critics go even further and insist
that the government's policy of subsidizing the landowners by
agricultural credit loans-on the theory that this would increase
farm production-has merely given the landlords more money
for speculation and for lending out at exorbitant rates of interest.
Although conditions in the two countries are far from parallel
- for one thing, China's landlords are much more powerful than
America's farmers-American war-time experience with the farm
bloc may help us to understand how a politically powerfu l economic group can influence government policy in its own interests.
The greatest dissatisfaction with government policies has arisen,
however, in connection with the war-time measure of colkcting
taxes from the peasants and small craftsmen in goods, such as
·rice, wheat or shoes, instead of money. This tax in kind is, of
course, a natural outgrowth of inflation. Similar steps have often
been used in other countries to combat hoarding. In a period
when prices are rising rapidly, taxes payable in currency are
unsatisfactory, particularly for a country at war. Vast quantities
of grain, meat and other farm products are needed to feed the
Army, and the government can be sure of getting these supplies
only if it collects them directly from the producer.
GRAFT, ABUSE OF LAWS CAUSE UNREST
At best, such a tax was bound to be unpopular with the farmers.
But resentment has been much greater in China because of
the presence of widespread favoritism and graft. It is generally
believed that the large landowners, having both influence and
money, get off rather lightly in the forced grain collections,
while the poorer farmers are forced to contribute up to half of
their total crop in "taxes." Furthermore, much of the grain that
is collected never reaches the government authorities but serves
merely to enrich the local militarists.
Equally unpopular with the Chinese peasant has been the en-
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forcement of the universal service law, which, in theory, is supposed to mobilize Chinese manpower for an all-out war effort.
In some areas half to two-thirds of the men of military age have
been conscripted for the Army. A large proportion of the men
thus taken from their homes are never heard from again. In addi-tion, a proportion of the men, horses and carts in every villag~..
are drafted for local transport and other non-combatant service.
The national service regulations are also subject to gross abuse.
The peasants complain that they are often forced to work on
projects wholly unconnected with the war for the benefit and
enrichment of local military leaders.
In several parts of the country the resentment against forced
grain collections and national labor service has led to open revolts against the government. The most serious of these occurred
in the widely separated provinces of Kweichow in the south and
Kansu in the far west. But several smaller peasant uprisings
are known to have taken place in other parts of Free China.
The Kansu revolt, in which many Moslem Chinese took part,
involved an area with a population of one to two million and was
still not fully suppressed in the middle of 1943. Kweichow's
uprising, which occurred earlier, was eventually put down.

MILITARY WEAKNESS
China's economic weakness is undoubtedly one of the main
explanations for the fact that her huge armies have been unable to drive a much smaller number of Japanese into the sea.
No one knows just how many men are under arms in China. But
the total is known to be at least 3,000,000, while Japan probably
does not have more than 600,000 soldiers in China. Some American military critics have expressed rather disparaging opinions
of the quality of China's armies, calling them poorly organized
and inefficient as a fighting force. They have even accused China
of manufacturing "paper victories," that is, of claiming a great
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victory in a communique when what actually took place was
only a minor maneuver.
We may discount many of these cnUcJsms as the opmwns
of persons whose information about China is limited. Yet one
of China's own generals was highly critical of China's military
leadership after a Chinese setback in the spring of 1943. Reviewing the campaign in a Chinese newspaper, General Ch'en Ch'eng
wrote that the Japanese success was obtained because of "our
negligence." He specifically criticized China's failure to coordinate the military, political and economic aspects of the war.
How are these harsh criticisms to be reconciled with the
"miracle of Chinese resistance" of which we spoke earlier? Certain it is that the Chinese Army showed itself capable of stubborn and heroic resistance in the early days of the war. Moreover, the Chinese have shown great originality and tenacity in
guerrilla operations.
The explanation of these seemingly conflicting views of China's
military capacity is not as difficult as it seems. As individuals
the Chinese make good soldiers. On that point there is general
agreement. American military observers who have worked and
fought with the Chinese maintain that the average soldier, if
well armed, well trained and capably led, is fully equal to the
Japanese. The weakness of the Chinese Army is due to lack of
weapons and supplies-the reasons for which we have already
examined-together with poor training and inferior leadership.

TRADITIONS TO BE OVERCOME
This latter statement should not be taken as a cntJctsm of
Chiang Kai-shek, although the Generalissimo has long occupied
the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese armies. Actually, the difficulty lies in the fact that Chiang does not have full
control over most of the huge army that is nominally under his
command. In China, soldiers have always owed a personal allegiance to provincial or local military leaders, as in Europe dur-
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.ing the Middle Ages. This feeling is giving way to one of loyalty
to the nation, but the old habits and loyalties are by no means
dead. While an increasing number of these local leaders will
take orders directly from Chiang Kai-shek, there are still important leaders who will not. And as there are great differences
in the capacity and resources of the various leaders, there is bound
to be a great difference in the training and equipment of the
troops.
On top of this is the unfortunate fact that China has never
trained a sufficient number of officers for so large an army. The
soldier has never held a high standing in Chinese society. For
this reason, perhaps, Army officers have been poorly paid and
few of China's better educated or progressively-minded young
men have sought military training. While the famous Whampoa
Military Academy has undoubtedly turned out some capable
leaders, the number has been small in relation to China's
needs. And even Whampoa graduates have not escaped the influences which made political wire-pulling more important than
military capacity in carving out a successful military career. The
fact that Whampoa men today hold must of the important posts
in the Army may be due as much to clannishness as to superior
ability or training.
The lack of adequate military leadership may also be affected
by Chinese traditions in still another way. The Chinese Army has
virtually none of the democratic tradition that would enable men
of superior ability to rise easily to positions of authority and leadership. Consequently, its leaders are not the kind of men who
are likely to demand military reforms. Nor do they think in
terms of an all-out program involving an increase in the production of war materials or the us~ of guerrilla tactics. On the contrary, they tend to cooperate with the reactionary landlordmerchant groups in preventing the mobilization of the peasants
and the placing of the country on a total war footing.
When we examine both the economic and the military weak-
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nesses of present-day China, we find that a major obstacle to
overcoming these weaknesses is political. Needed reforms are
blocked by government officials whose thinking has not changed
as fast the conditions around them. We must, therefore, examine
the political situation in present-day China.
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POLITICAL DIVISIONS
Many Americans assume that the only important division in
Chinese politics is between the Right as represented by the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, and the Left as represented by the
Communists. This is far from true. All members of the Kuomintang subscribe, in theory at least, to the doctrines of Sun
Yat-sen, summed up in the Three People's Principles: (1) Nationalism (freedom from foreign control), (2) Democracy and
(3) Livelihood (freedom from want). But since it is in e!Iect the
only legal party, the Kuomintang contains many diverse and
often conflicting elements. The groups within it divide up more
along lines of personal or sectional loyalty than on questions of
principle. Nevertheless wide differences in ideas do exist.
Political groups in China are not cle<}rly marked and are constantly shifting. Hence any brief account, like the one below,
is bound to be oversimplified and may not be up to date in detail.
The important thing to remember is that many different shades
of political opinion are represented in "Kuomintang" China and
in the Kuomintang party itself.
Of the many conflicting factions within the Kuomintang, four
are of outstanding importance: (1) the business-banking group
headed by H. H. Kung, Minister of Finance; (2) the "Political
Science Group" containing both businessmen and landlords;
(3) the political bloc known as the CC clique, led by two
brothers, Chen Li-fu and Chen Kuo-fu; and (4) the military
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clique dominated by the "Whampoa Group" of officers, of which
General Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War, is the leading figure.
There are many smaller groups and a number of prominent personalities who do not belong to any group, such as T. V. Soong,
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Sun Fo, the son of Sun
Yat-sen, founder of modern China.
All four of the main factions hold important cabinet posts.
Early in 1944 the CC group had the largest cabinet representation. It controlled the ministries of educat.ion, communication
and social welfare, and had until recently controlled that of
information.*
BUSINESS-BANKING GROUP

Dr. H. H. Kung, the Finance Minister, has been described as
a sort of political tent under whirh officials of every shade of
opinion find shelter. He may be said to represent the businessbanking group, which, before the war, was moderately progressive in outlook. It could be counted on to support most
measures looking to the modernization and strengthening of
China's economic structure. But, as we have seen, the loss of
the port cities has brought the landlords and merchants of the
interior into an increasingly dominant position. With the change
Kung's policies have shifted. But despite the shift, his influence
over China's economic and financial policies has been increasingly
challenged by the faction known as the Cheng Hsueh Hsi, or
*In November 1944 the Chinese cabinet was reorganized. Among the principal changes were: 0. K. Yui succeeded H. H. Kung as Minister of Finance,
but Mr. Kung remained as Vice-President of the Executive Yuan; General
Ch'en Ch'eng succeeded General Ho Ying-chin as Minister of War, but
General Ho remained as Chief of the General Staff; Chu Chia-hua succeeded
Chen Li-fu as Minister of Education, but Chen Li-fu became Minister of
Kuomintang Organization . Jn December T. V. Soong, while retaining his
post of Foreign Minister, was made Acting President of the Executive Yuan
(equivalent to Premier), a position formerly !Jeld by Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek.-Eo.
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"Political Science Group," headed by General Chang Chun and
Governor Wu Ding-chang.
POLITICAL SCIENCE GROUP

As its name suggests, the Political Science Group was ongially organized by Western-educated Chinese who favored a
modernization of China's economic and political structure. Its
emphasis, however, has been upon decentralization. It wants more
freedom for private enterprise in the provinces and provincial
control over monopolies rather than control by the National Government. It advocates government subsidies to private interests
rather than all-out government ownership or control. Because
of this emphasis, the group has found its support chiefly among
leaders in the provinces. H. H. Kung dominates the National
Government's financial system, while the Political Science Group
has controlled economic policy in the provinces. There has been
a constant, sharp struggle for power between the two. Each has
the backing of an important section· of the banking and industrial interests. Because of its ties with the provincial landlordmerchant class and the militaristic local governments, the Political Science Group tends to throw its influence in favor of
conservative policies.
THE CC GROUP

The C.C. P'ai is a Chinese version of an American political
machine. It has, indeed been called China's Tammany Hall. It
owes its immense political influence to the fact that its men hold
most of the strategic positions in China's one legal party-the
Kuomintang. One of the two Chen brothers who head up the
CC group, Chen Li-fu, is the Minister of Education, a post which
gives him control over the indoctrination of students and the
intellectual life of the nation. The other, Chen Kuo-fu, is head
of the Personnel Division of Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters,
where he controls the distribution of government jobs and is in
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MEMBERS OF A CHINESE ARMY UNIT.

charge of the appointment of local hsien, or county, magistrates.
Another CC leader, Hsu En-tseng is Vice-Minister of Communications and head of the powerful Investigation Bureau, while
another, Ku Cheng-kang, is Minister of Social Affairs. Through
this latter post, the CC group not only has control over labor and
the rural cooperatives but has full powers over all organizations
in Chungking and vicinity.
To buttress this political power the CC group several years
ago set up its own secret police patterned closely on the Nazi
Gestapo. This police has directed its activities chiefly against
students, university professors and other intellectuals suspected of
either democratic or Communist leanings. Since both students and
professors have been hard hit by the inflation and are dependent
on a government rice allowance for existence, the supervisory activities of the CC secret police have been highly effective in controlling the expression of opinion.
Because the CC group has been highly critical of British and
American policies since Pearl Harbor and is strongly anti-Soviet,
its inOuence has caused many misgivings among United Nations
leaders. The C.C. P'ai has often been accused by democratic
groups within China of Fascist, and even pro-Japanese, sympathies. Charges of this kind cannot easily be proved or disproved. But the CC group has invited them by adopting many of
the trimmings of Nazism and Fascism in its methods of party
organization. Its secret police, for example, and its methods for
the control of labor and the cooperatives, were consciously patterned after German and Italian models. In domestic policy, the
CC group has consistently fought all efforts to make the Kuomintang more democratic, and has taken the lead in urging the
suppression of the Communists.

TH E ARMY
Since the revolution of 1911 China has been dominated largely
by military leaders. The rise of the Kuomintang in 1927-2R
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brought an end to the rule of the old-type war lords. But the
Army leaders associated with the Kuomintang still have power
and influence far beyond that wielded by n'lilitary men in most
Western countries. Chief among these, of course, is Chiang Kaishek himself. But there are many others whose names are not
well known abroad. Many are governors of provinces; others
hold important posts in the Chungking government. The Army
has been dominated in recent years by the graduates of the
Whampoa Military Academy, of which Chiang Kai-shek is honorary President. This group is known as the Whampoa P'ai.
THREE IMPORTANT GENERALS

Probably the most influential Army man in China is General
Ho Ying-chin, M.inister of War. He is best characterized as an
Army politician. Although General Ho is not a member of the
Whampoa Group, one of its leaders, Ku Chu-tung, is considered
to be a "Ho" man. The Chinese Minister of War nominally has
little real power, but General Ho exerts great jnfluence by balancing rival Army cliques against one another. He has retained
his influence despite the fact that he often has been accused of
being pro-Japanese, anti-British and anti-democratic.
Although Ho is a rival of the CC group in the struggle for
power within the government, his policies have not been basically
very different from those of the CC. He has never got along any
too well with British, American or Soviet military men. And he
has made no secret of his opposition to the Chinese Communists.
He opposed Chiang Kai-shek's decision to form a united front
· with the Communists before the outbreak of war, and he is believed to have been chiefly responsible for the attack on the Communist New Fourth Army a few years ago. Although his action
in dispatching troops against the kidnappers of Chiang Kai-shek
in 1936 is said by some people to have endangered Chiang's life,
the Generalissimo has never disciplined him or openly opposed
him in any way.
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Probably the ablest fie ld commander in the Chinese army is
General Ch'en Ch'eng, who in 1943 commanded the Chinese
forces on the Salween River front in Yunnan. Modern in his
methods and ways of thinking, General Ch'en has scored several
notable successes against the Japanese. Important also is the fact
that he gets along well with the Brjtish and Americans and
understands their ways of working. Yet at the same time Ch'en
Ch'eng enjoys great prestige in China. He has held a number
of government posts, including that of governor of Hupei province, and works closely with Chiang Kai-shek.
Another important Whampoa leader is General Hu Tsung-nan,
commander of Chiang Kai-shek's famous First Army. General
Hu is aggressive and ambitious. He commands some 500,000 of
the best troops in China. either he nor his troops have been in
action against the Japanese. They are stationed in the northwest,
supposedly as a strategic reserve to be used in an emergency.
The fact that this huge army has been maintained in the area
adjacent to the Communist districts, cutting the Chinese Red
Army ofi from other parts of Free China or from possible contact with the Soviet Union, has caused many observers to charge
that Hu is there to "watch" the Communists. General Hu has,
however, borrowed some of the Communists' methods, and has
encouraged the development of industrial cooperatives in his
area. In many respects he must be reckoned among China's more
energetic and capable leaders. He is known as a Chiang Kai-shek
man and, like Ch'en Ch'eng, is independent of the more reactionary groups wi~hin the Army.

SECRET POLICE
There are many other military leaders with influence on the
Chinese political scene, but we shall not complicate the picture
with a longer list. Mention must be made, however, of Tai Li,
whose name inspires fear in Chjna. He is the head of the secret
police operating under the direction of the Military Afiairs Com39

40

mittee. T his is anothe r Gestapo-like organ ization, which has
little connection with the CC political police, mentioned above;
it is in some ways a rival body. A lthough active primarily in military zones, it is sometimes in conflict with the CC police. T here
are also the hsien ping, or gendarmes, who nominally have the
responsib.ility for policing communications in the war zones.
Originally set up as a kind of M.P. to help maintain army discipline, the hsien ping frequently make unauthorized arrests.
Indirectly connected with the Army is the San Min Chu I
Youth Corps, named after the San Min Chu I or Three People's
Principles of Sun Yat-sen. This organization has as its purpose
the training of young men and women in the teachings of Sun
Yat-sen so that they may become politically informed members
of the Kuomintang. Although bearing some resemblance to the
Hitler Youth, it is not really a "youth" corps but is made up in
large part of older men. It has attracted, however, a good number
of students and other young people. Since membership in the
Corps is an aid in obtaining a rice subsidy, its ranks have grown
rapidly since the war and it now constitutes an important political
force. Although violently anti-Communist, it is independent of
the CC clique. According to some observers, the Youth Corps
has become more progressive in the past few years, but this judgment is disputed by others.

T.V. SOONG
One of the few Chinese leaders who is well known abroad is
T.V. Soong, now Foreign Minister. He has played a prominent
part in government affairs since the beginning of the Kuomintang Revolution in 1926. But although able, honest and experienced in financial matters, "T.V." has never enjoyed a large fo llowing in China. Like his sister, Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, he is
regarded as too Western in thought and habits to gain great influence . He is the center of a small group made up largely of men
who have studied in the United States or England, and contain41

ing professors, bankers, engineers and other intellectuals who
have faith in the system of Western capitalism as applied to
China. H e was head of the Bank of China until February 1944,
when he was replaced by H. H . Kung. H is friends believe that
he will yet rise to a position of leadership in China, and he is well
regarded by the British and Ameri~an officials with whom he has
worked in the past few years.
It would, of course, be a mistake to overemphasize the political
divjsions within the Kuomintang. Most of them are of long
standing, and they are probably no more serious today than before the war. Lacking legal opposition parties, the Chinese have
given a place in the government to leaders of all the factions
through an elaborate system of compromises. This has meant a
sacrifice of unity, but it has provided fairly wide representation
for the various military and civilian cljques in high governmental
posts. It is only when we recognize the peculiar make-up of
the government that we can understand the position of Chiang
Kai-shek.
CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S LEADERSHIP ESSENTIAL
The fact that Chiang js President of the Republic, Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Army has led many people
to think of him as a dictator. This is hardly accurate. Although
on paper his powers are great, actually he serves as a sort of
balance-wheel, stabilizing the conflicting forces of the various
groups. Changes in policy usually result, not from any initiative
on the part of Chiang Kai-shek, but from a realignment of the
press ures operating on him. Even Chiang's enemies pay tribute
to the skill with which he has maintained the stability of the
National Government during the past fifteen years. It is doubtful
whether any other Chinese leader could have held the government together during this critical period . Chiang's real authority
derives from his own outstanding q ualities of leadership and
fro m the enormous prestige which he enjoys among all factions
in China and among the people at large.
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The weaknesses in the present set-up arjse largely from factors beyond the immediate control of the Generalissimo. It so
happens that the progressive forces in China are mostly outside
the government, and to a large extent outside of the K uomintang.
Hence there is little effective pressure for constructive changes.
' Individ ually, many of the more prominent government officials
and employees would probably welcome a more progressive program. But despite their posts they have little real political power,
less today than when the government was located at Nanking.
The real economic and politica l power is exercised behind the
scenes by the merchants and landlords of the interior. A revitalization of the government in the interest of a more effective prosecution of the war could be achieved only by the emergence of new
political forces capable of challenging the power of the landlordmerchant coalition.
THE COMMUNISTS

For the past fifteen years the Communist Party has provided
the chief opposition to the Kuomintang or government party.
During the revolution of 1925-1927, when the Kuomintang came
into power, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party
worked jn close alliance. Then a split occurred and under Chiang
Kai-shek's leadership the Kuomintang turned against the Communists. The latter set up a soviet regime in Kiangsi province
but after many campaigns they were ousted from this region
by government troops and made the.ir famous "Long March" to
Shensi in the northwest. Campaigns against them continued.
Finally, in December 1936, occurred the dramatic kidnapping of
Chiang Kai-shek by the "Young Marshal," Chang Hsueh-liang,
who was sympathetic wjth the then widespread demand for a
united front against the growing menace of Japan. A united
front agreement was in fact concluded in 1937, shortly before
the Japanese attack. The government agreed to stop fighting the
Communists and the Communists agreed to place themselves

44

CHILDREN OF GUERRILLA FIGHTERS.

under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership and to modify thejr more
radical social policies.
As China is not like any other country, so Chinese Communism has no parallel elsewhere. You can find in jt resemblances
to Communist movements in other countries and you can also
find resemblances to the "grass-roots" Populist movements that
have figured in American history. Because there is no other
effective opposition party in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many progressive and patriotic Chinese
who know little of the doctrines of Karl Marx or Stalin and care
less. Raymond Gram Swing described. Chinese Communists as
"agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices."
AGRARIAN AND POLITICAL POLICIES

In the past the Chinese Communists dealt very harshly and
ruthlessly with landlords and others whom they considered op-

pressors of the people, and expropriated landlord estates in order
to divide them up among the poor peasants. Today, in the interests of the united front, the Communists have largely abandoned these extreme methods. Their present program is reformist rather than revolutionary. They no longer expropriate the
property of landlords, except that of traitors; in fact they welcome
the cooperation of landlords or anyone else who will help fight
Japan. But they have lowered rents, taxes and exorbitant interest
rates, and encouraged education, cooperatives and other measures
of popular improvement. In addition, they have developed a
rough and ready system of local democracy in the villages under
their control. Elected councils have been set up in village, town
and distrjct, and the local executive officials are also chosen by
popular vote. Tax assessment committees, made up of local
farmers, have been set up to assure fair administration of taxation. These measures, reflecting the most deep-seated desires of
the Chinese peasant, have given him the feeling of having a stake
jn the war and have thus succeeded in arousing the peasants for
support of the war effort.
Apart from a small area around northern Shensi, near the
"Red capital" at Yen an, the region under Communist control is
located behind the Japanese lines. Huge sections of the northern
provinces have been retaken from the Japanese by guerrilla fighters organized and led by the Communists. Estimates of the number of people living in these areas run as high as fifty million.
American observers who have visited these regions report that
the people and the resources of these regions have been organized for defense on a more effective basis than in Kuomintang
China. The keystone of this defense is guerrjlla organizations of
the local peasants, although they work in close relationship with
the troops of the Chinese Red Army.
Although the Red Army, usually referred to nowadays as the
Eighth Route (or 18th Group) Army and the New Fourth Army,
is nominally under the command of Chiang Kai-shek, this ar-
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rangement has remained largely theoretical. According to the
agreement entered into between the Communists and the National Government in 1937, the Red armies were to receive about
$700,000 in Chinese currency monthly to meet their payrolls, and
they were also to be armed and equipped like any other branch
of the Chinese Army. Actually, the Communist troops say they
have received no pay from the Nat.ional Government since December 1940, and no ammunition has been sent them since
October 1939. Even medical supplies have been held up, although
three truckloads sent from America in 1942 eventually reached
them. Contrary to many people's impression, no munitions have
ever been shipped from the Soviet Unjon to the Chinese Red
armies. Had the Soviets desired to send such supplies, they probably would have been unable to do so because the Communist
areas have been blockaded by 500,000 to 600,000 Chungking
troops. All supplies shipped from Russia have been sent to the
National Government.

MILITARY EFFICIENCY
Despite the blockade, the Communist and guerrilla armies,
in the opmion of some observers, have in recent years conducted
.a more vigorous campaign against the Japanese than have the
Chungking armies. While we have no way of measuring the
effectiveness of the behind-the-lines guerrilla activities, reports
by such competent observers as Lieut. Col. Evans F. Carlson of
the United States Marine Corps indicate a rather remarkable
military efficiency. Figures on enemy casualties also seem to show
.a relative gain in the efficjency of the troops affiliated with the
Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army as compared
with the Kuomintang armies-although some observers cast
doubt on these figures.
Since all the advantages of numbers, equipment and outside
supplies have been on the side of the Kuomintang armies, the rjse
m the relative effectiveness of the Communist armies is appar47

ently based on a greater will to resist among the Communist
troops and a more thorough mobilization of the human and
material resources in the guerrilla districts. Spokesmen for t;he
Communists attribute their relatively greater effectiveness to their
agrarian reforms and to the introduction of democratic selfgovernment. Through these changes new energies have been
released and new hopes aroused. The war has become a people's
war in the fullest sense.
KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST RELATIONS

This background should be kept in mind in reviewing the relationship between the KuominLang and the Communists s.ince
the outbreak of war. The relationship might best be described as
an armed truce. Following the agreement entered into in 1937,
the Communists have been tolerated on a semi-legal basis. They
have been perm.itted to maintain representatives in Chungking,
and they have been allowed to publish a newspaper in the capital.
They are even represented in the People's Political Council. But
outside of Chungking, except in the "special" districts controlled
by the Eighth Route Army, Communist Party activities are still
prohibited. Nor, as we have seen, have they received for several
years any financial assistance or supplies from the National Government at Chungking.
Chungking's suspicion of the Communists can be explained on
many grounds. In part, no doubt, it derives from the influence
of reactionary elements in the Kuomintang who are opposed to
all liberal or progressive forces and who find it convenient to
brand all such movements as Communist whether or not there is
any basis for this charge. It is known that such elements have the
ear of the Generalissimo and that they try to control the information which reaches him. In part, Chungking's attitude toward the
Communists stems from the principle, accepted since 1928, that
during the present phase of "political tutelage"-at least until
all vestiges of foreign control have been removed-China needs a
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strong one-party government. Hence the Kuomintang alone must
bear the responsibility for national policy. Finally, suspicion of
the Communists is nourished by the fear that, after the war if
not before, they will use any opportunities that are given them to
extend their own influence at the expense of the Kuomintang and
even attempt to overthrow the National Government. Although
the Communists stoutly deny any revolutionary intentions, the
suspicion remains.
Since 1941 the tension between the Kuomintang and the Communists has been almost at the breaking point. Rumors have
been rife regarding the possibility of open civil war, but reliable
information on the situatjon has been extraordinarily difficult to
obtain. News sent out of China is, of course, subject to rigid
government censorship. Up to the end of 1943, the Chinese government ~ad refused to permit either American or Brit.ish military observers to go into the Northwest. All news from this
region is rigidly censored.
THREAT OF CIVIL WAR

In September 1943, for example, Chungking reported that
10,000 Communist troops had "attacked and destroyed" a large
force of Kuomintang troops. Some time later, an Eighth Route
Army spokesman denied the charge completely. Americans returning from China report that incidents are constantly occurring between the rival forces, any one of which could easily lead to a fullfledged civil war .if either party so desired. There is also constant
danger lest some ambitious general attack the Communists in
hope of capitalizing on the prevailing anti-Communist sentiment
jn Chungking to strengthen his political or military posicion.
It is scarcely necessary to point out the importance of preventing civil war in China at this time. Such a conflict would not
only undermine China's miljtary effectiveness and thus play into
the hands of Japan, but it might cause serious difficulties within
the United Nations. At present the United States, Britain and
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Russia are agreed on the necessity of preventing civil conflict.
Should such a conflict arise, they might become divided as to
the best way of dealing with the situation.
In what many observers regarded as an effort to quiet American, British and Russian fears of a civjl war in China, Chiang
Kai-shek issued an official statement on September 13, 1943, declaring that the "Chinese Government does not have any particular
demand to make on the Chinese Communist Party" and was
prepared "to be tolerant." He added that the "Communist problem is purely a political problem and should be solved by political
means."
KUOMINTANG DEMANDS

But then he went on to accuse the Communists of "assaulting
national government troops" and "forcefully occupying our national territory." He repeated demands previously made by the
Kuomintang for the disbandment of the Eighth Route Army and
the dissolution of all Communist governmental organizations, including the local governments, while o!Iering no concessions to
the Communist demand for guarantees for the rights of a minority party. He demanded that the Communist Party "redeem its
pledge" made in )ts declaration of 1937: (1) to struggle for the
realization of the Three People's Principles; (2) to abandon the
policy of overthrowing the Kuomintang regime by force; (3) to
dissolve its present government organization an~ by carrying
jnto practice the principles of democracy thus help to bring about
the political unity of the whole nation; (4) to disband the Red
Army by incorporating it into the National Army under the
direct command of the Military Council of the National Government.
These are, of course, demands which the Communists accepted
in principle at the outset of the war. They have carried out some
of them and have stated their willingness to carry out all of
them provided the National Government takes practical steps to
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safeguard their democratic rights as a minority party. Specifically,
the Communists ask some assurance against a return of the landlords and moneylenders in the areas where land reforms have
been put into effect. They ask that immediate steps be taken
to assure local self-government and the creation of a national
People's Congress in which Communists and other minority
groups might obtain fair representation. Similarly, before the
Red Army is placed under Chungking control, they want assurance that the men wjll be paid in full, be adequately armed and
supplied, and that all forces will be used effectively in the war
against Japan.
At the Cairo conference it is reported that "the conferees took
cognizance of the fact that internal differences between the troops
of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Commun.ist armies must be
overcome before China could be used as a primary base for an
attack against Japan ." We still do not know what effect this discussion had on the tense relations between the two parties. Feeling still runs strong on both sides, but neither side seems disposed
to violate the truce that has prevailed, with the exception of minor
outbreaks, since 1937. There is reason to hope that a compromise
may be worked out that will enable both groups to throw their
entire resources into the struggle against Japan.
FEDERATION OF CHINESE DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

It is not quite fair to say that the Communists are the only
opposition party in China. Several minor parties exist which have
generally democratic objectives. Most of these are banded together
in an organization called the Federation of Chinese Democratic
Parties. This organization, headed by Chang Lan, a former governor of Szechwan, was formed on March 25, 1941. Some time
later it issued a Ten Point Program which is an "'xcellent statement of democratic principles as applied to war-time China. The
five leading groups participating in this declaration are:
1. The National Socialist Party. Despite its name, th,is party
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is not "Nazi"; nor is it socialist. Formerly more conservative
than the Kuomintang, it has become moderately progressive. It
has, however, little following outside of academic circles.
2. The Young China Party. This is an essentially conservative
party with a moderately democratic outlook.
3. Tl2e Third Party is the lineal descendant and inheritor of
the original revolutionary principles of the Kuomintang . It broke
off from the latter in 1927 when the Kuomintang swung sharply
to the right. It has the greatest political potentialities of any of
the five groups.
4. The Rural Reconstructionists are not in any sense a political
party, but consist of several groups who are interested in the economic and educational reconstruction of the Chinese village.
Among the leaders is James Y. C. Yen, founder of the Mass Education Movement.
5. Somewhat similar is the Vocational Education Group,
which is comprised of men connected with the vocational schools
in the province of Kiangsu.
None of these five groups possesses any real political influence,
and none has any popular following to speak of. As a federation
they could wield considerable influence if a representative form
of government were established, but at present their activities
are sharply curbed. They are, however, worth greater attention
than they have yet received in this country.
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STRENGTHENING CHINA'S WAR EFFORT
It is generally believed that the military strategy worked out
at the Cairo conference involves a major drive against Japan from
the Asiatic mainland . In that case the Un.ited Nations have m uch
at stake in strengthening China for that attack. Many America ns
have supposed that this cou ld be done merely by reconqueri ng
Burma and reopening the Burma Road. Actually, it is doubtful
whether this would be enough, even from the standpoint of supplies alone. But when the complex of economic, military and
political factors affecting China's war effort is considered, it is
quite plain that a much more comprehensive program is required.

SUPPLY ROUTES
The supply problem in itself is bound to be difficult. At best the
Burma Road, even if reopened and supplemented by the new
Ledo Road, can carry only a small volume of supplies into China.
Hence most military men believe that an offensive against Japan
from China can be supported only if, in addition to reopening the
Bmma Road, some of the ports, such as Canton and Hongkong,
can be reconquered. The opening of a port through which foreign
supplies could be shipped into China would not only strengthen
her military position but would help to check inflation.
China has already received more American dnd British credits
than she can easily utilize under present conditions, and it is
qu ~ tionable whether further financial assistance would be helpful at this time. In any case, the experience with American
financial ajd in the past suggests that additional assistance should
be provided only upon evidence of concrete steps to stimulate
war industries and curb speculation. Much can still be done
to develop the production of war materials within China, but only
if those elements in the Chungking government favorable to re-

53

form can overcome the political and social obstacles which have
hitherto hamstrung such efforts.
ARMY REORGANIZATION

If an increased Row of modern equipment is to be used effectively, the Chinese Army needs to be reorganized along modern
lines. This js not as impossible a task as has been suggested in
some circles, but it can be carried out only by Chinese commanders who are convinced of its necessity. The lack of cooperation which American instructors and technicians have encountered from some Chinese officers indicates that a reorganization
of the Chinese high command must precede any large-scale
efforts at technical reorganiza~ion. More emphasis also needs to
be placed upon training the Kuomintang armies in effective
guerrilla methods in cooperation with people of the areas in
Central and South China where guerrjlla warfare has never been
developed. The dispatch of American observers and technical
assistance to the guerrilla areas of the orthwest may also be
regarded as an essential step in the accentuation of the behindthe-lines warfare which has proved such a nightmare to the Japanese. The guerrilla stronghold ::onta.ins potential air bases which,
if properly developed, could bring Japan's home islands within
effective bombing range.
Our analysis makes it clear that revitalization of China's war
effort calls for political readjustments. Because China is sensitive
-and with reason-regarding foreign interference in her internal
affairs, this problem may be hard to solve. Experience with a
century of Western imperialism has made the Chinese suspicious
of foreign influence of any kind. The Chinese, regardless of
party, are determined that Chinese natjonal policy shall never
again be dictated by foreigners. Because of the depth of this
feeling, the American, British and Soviet governments have been
hesitant to offer advice to the Chinese government on matters of
domestic policy. They have, however, limited their economic and
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military assistance because o£ fear that any supplies they send
might be used in civil strife rather than against the Japanese.
"ONE FOR ALL, ALL FOR ONE"

Yet as partners in a common war against a dangerous and resourceful foe, all of the Un.ited Nations are necessarily concerned
in bringing maximum pressure against the enemy. The difference between an early, decisive victory against Japan and a long,
indecisive campaign may be measured in hundreds of thousands
of American and British lives and perhaps in millions o£ Chinese
lives. Purely destructive criticism does not help China; rather
it plays into the hands of our enemies, who seek to divide the
United Nations from one another. Friendly and constructive
criticism, directed toward strengthening the common war effort
and toward strengthening China to play the great post-war role
which history has assigned to her, should not, however, be re garded as presumptuous. Basically, it should be regarded in the
same light as Chiang Kai-shek's own commendable efiorts to
br.ing about a settlement of the conflict between the British government and the Indian National Congress. This viewpoint has
been expressed very ably by a distinguished Chinese writer, Lin
Yu-tang, in justifying his own frank and vigorous criticisms of
American and British policies. In a recent book, Between Tears
and Laugher, Dr. Lin wrote:
Among allies at war, every citizen has the right and the duty
to criticize the conduct of allied governments in matters that
concern the common war .... I should be highly appreciative
if an Allied citizen would point out where the conduct of the
Chinese Government is slowing down the war with Japan,
and, by such frank criticism, lessen the cost of Chinese lives
before the war with Japan is won.
China's allies cannot, of course, tell her exactly what kind of
political reorganization is necessary to revitalize her war effort.
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Poli(ical adjustments necessarily represent difficult compromises
which must come from within. It may be assumed that Chiang
Kai-shek would like to see an accentuation of China's war effort
but that he does not have the political strength to effect the
necessary governmental changes single-handed. The Cairo conference, offering China more than she could possibly achieve by
her own arms, undoubtedly added greatly to Chiang's prestige
and presumably tended to lessen the influence of the anti-United
Nations clique in Chungking. Much still depends, however, on
the practical steps taken to implement the Cairo declaratjon.
Chiang's ability to take his country more actively into the war
will rest on the concrete arrangements which are made to provide
the Chinese armies w.i1 h modern equipment and adequate supplies. As a realistic political leader, Chiang knows that if he is
to alienate the reactionary influences withjn the Kuomintang
that are sabotaging the war, he must be assured of the economic
and military supplies necessary to support his new position.
Similarly, .if he is to permit military assistance to flow to the Eighth
Route Army on the same basis as to other armies, he must be
able to show that it is part of a larger United Nations strategical
plan to hasten the final downfall of Japan.
STRONG WAR GOVERNMENT NEEDED

There 1s every reason to believe that the creation of a strong
war government headed by Chiang Kaj-shek and supported by
positive assistance from the United Nations would be extremely
well received within China. Its long-run strength would depend,
however, upon its willingness to set up a genuinely democratic
machinery that would permit the popular forces which have
always supported the war to make themselves felt. A promise has
already been made that such machinery would be created after
the war. But progressive Chinese have long urged that at least
preliminary steps for the establishment of a constitutional govc>rnment be taken now so that the government might reap the
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political advantages of such a move during the war. Possibly
measures looking in this direction are already under way. China's
exper.ience in the war thus far has been that resistance to Japan
and the trend toward democracy are twin fotces that are so closely
interrelated that it is impossible to separate them.

A VIF. W OF Til E ll U RMA ROAD.

57

CHINA .PLANS FOR THE FUTURE
It would be very wrong to conclude from what has been said
above that China is sliding back into her old backward state
and that hope of her developing as a strong, democratic modern
nation must be abandoned. At present, China is passing through
a very difficult phase in her history-one in which she greatly
needs the sympathy, understanding and forbearance of her friends
abroad. When Japan is defeated and China is able to turn her
attention to the problems of reconstruction, we may expect that
the progress interrupted in 1937 will be resumed. Even today a
lively interest in plans for post-war reconstruction is apparent
in Chungking. Desp,ite the confusion and discouragements of
war-time conditions, such plans are already being formulated in
very concrete terms.
These plans have had as their general objective a rapid industrialization of China with special emphasis on heavy industries,
power plants, railway and highway construction, aviation and
waterway development. Less emphasis is placed on light industry. Because of the shortage of private industrial capital, it is
assumed that the large-scale projects will be financed and controlled either by government corporations or by a combination of
government and private capital. Foreign aid will be welcomed,
provided there are no strings attached. Steps were taken jn the
fall of 1943 to liberalize the rules governing foreign investment
during the reconstruction period.
The need for railway construction is especially great. Before
the war the whole of China, including Manchuria, had only
about 26 miles of railway for each million of population. In contrast, India had 262 miles per million, Japan 349, the Soviet Union
511, Great Britain 754, and the United States 3,200 miles. Furthermore, China has very few modern highways.
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INDUSTRIAL POTENTIALS

Three important areas in China are suitable for the development of heavy industries. The most important of these is southern Manchuria, wh.ich the Japanese have been attempting to
develop on a huge scale since they took over this region in 1931.
Next is the Central China area, with Hankow as its center, which
was the only significant iron and steel producing region before
the war. Finally, there is the area around the present capital at
Chungking, which has been partly developed during the war.
Two other areas in China's southwest and northwest await
industrial development. The district around Kunming, capital
of Yunnan in the southwest, has supplies of tin and copper easily
available and has substantial coal resources. Although it lacks
iron ore, such ore could be brought in rather cheaply from the
province of Sikang by building a fairly short railway line. The
northwest-around the city of Siam-has both coal and petroleum,
and it has the further advantage of being near the chief cottonproducing areas. Altogether, the mineral resources of the ten
provinces in the southwest and northwest are large enough to
support industrial growth for many years to come. They include
more than a third of China's 246 billion metric tons of coal reserves, and fairly abundant supplies of such metals as tin, gold,
copper, mercury, tungs"ten, antimony, lead, zinc and manganese.
GOALS

Something of the extent of the planned development in the tenyear pedod following the war may be seen in the program outlined by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The goals set by this
plan were as follows:
Commodity
Steel
Coal
Gold

Total Ten-Year Output
14,000,000 tons
500,000,000 tons
12,000,000 ounces

Output in Tenth Year
5,000,000 tons
100,000,000 tons
2,500,000 ounces
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Cement
Steel Plates
Cotton Yarn
Railways
Rails
Locomotives
Steamships

85,000,000
5,000,000
29,000,000
48,000
3,360,000
2,400
3,000,000

barrels
tons
bales
kilometers
tons

20,000,000 barrels
1,000,000 tons
5,000,000 bales

tons

Though ambitious, this is not an impossible program. Although
China has been slow in carrying out the reconstruction program
outlined by Sun Yat-sen some twenty years ago, the progress
made in the few years preceding the Japanese invasion-and in
limited areas since the war-proves that China has the technical
competence to carry such a program to completion. The economic
and political obstacles that have hampered industrializatjon during the war years should be eliminated by the reappearance of
foreign trade and the re-emergence of the more progressive business leaders of the port cities. Some observers predict, however,
that the emphas,is on government enterprises will not be main tained rigidly, and that some of China's wealthy families will
profit by their government connections to the extent of largescale participation in the more profitable reconstruction projects.
They fear that unless democratic safeguards are created, Chinese
industrialization will follow the pattern of Japanese industrialization. Japan's experience shows that the development of modern
industry does not necessarily raise the livjng standards of the
majority of the population but may merely serve to accentuate
the gap between the rich and the poor.
Moreover, it must be recognized that China can support a
modern industry only if her hundred million peasant farmers
become more productive. And there is still great confusion regarding the fundamentals of her post-war agricultural policy. In
this country we think of agricultural productivity in terms of
tractors, combines, commercial fertilizers and rotation of crops.
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None of these, save rotat.ion of crops, would mean much to China
under present conditions. China's farms are much too small to
apply the methods of large-scale cultivation used in this country.
Given the conditions under which he must work, the average
Chinese farmer is reasonably efficient, but he is desperately handicapped-as we have seen- by an archaic system of land tenure,
heavy indebtedness at usurious interest rates, extremely high
tax rates, and lack of capital for even his simple operations.
While the Communists have put a program of land reform
into effect, opinion in Kuomintang China is seriously divided
on basic policy. Some groups would have the government extend
credit to the tenants so that they might buy land from the landlords. Others favor the nationalization of all land, while other
groups would limit the amount of land any individual may own.
But powerful elements with.in the Kuomintang are opposed to
any fundamental change in landlord-tenant relations, suggesting
that nothing can be done beyond an attempt to enforce the rent
law restricting }and rent to 37.5 per cent of the proceeds of the
farm.
NEED FOR IRRIGATIO N

All groups are agreed, however, on the necessity for increasing
the area of cultivated land. Since much of China is far too dry
for intensive farming, an extension of irrigation facilities is desperately needed. There is room in China for a dozen TV A's.
Such projects would employ millions of men in the critical postwar period and when finished would provide a solid basis for
improv.i ng the living standards of tens of millions of Chinese
families.
China's post-war industrial and agricultural policies will, in
the last analysis, be determined by political forces. Her political
prospects hinge on two developments. The first is the chance of
arriving at a permanent basis of settlement of the long-standing
conflict between Kuomintang and the Communists. Following

61

the Cairo conference there seemed to be an excellent chance of a
temporary br.idging of the conflict for the duration of the war.
If the war against Japan is intensified, some of the misunderstanding between the two groups may be removed. But a permanent
basis of settlement seems to rest on two things: (1) the Kuomintang's willingness to sponsor a fundamental program of land
reform; and (2) the extent to which minority parties will be
able to work within the framework of the new Constitution . The
Communist Party has already disclaimed any intention of pushing a socialist or Communist program in the post-war period
and has indicated its immediate interest lies in a program of
moderate democratic reforms.
DEMOCRACY'S FUTURE

The second development on which the future of post-war China
hinges is the development of a genuine democracy under the new
Constitution. The Draft Constitution has many good features,
although, as pointed out above, many Chinese feel that it should
be revised in order to make the government more responsive to
popular control. No constitution can guarantee democracy, however, and many cr.itics are fearful lest the reactionary groups that
now dominate the Kuomintang may continue to frustrate any
genuine expression of the popular will under the Constitution.
Against this fear stands the indisputable fact that the war has
given the Chinese people a new sense of thejr powers as well
as of their essential democratic rights. Once a people has been
aroused as the Chinese have been in these past few years, it is
impossible to believe that they will not find a way to shape the
policies of their government.
The impact of war has released great stores of unsuspected
energy which have enabled China to surprise the world by the
strength and tenacity of her resistance to Japanese aggression.
After the war this energy will be devoted to the unfinished task
of building a new China, firmly rooted in the great traditions
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of Chinese civilization but adapted to the necessities of modern
life. With her vast population and undeveloped resources C ·ina
may be expected to take her place among the great powers of \e
world. We need not fear this; on the contrary, we may be sure
that China's inAuence will be exerted on the side of preserving
peace in the Pacific. In fact, China's major interests- peace and
peaceful trade-coinc,ide precisely with those of the United States.
A firm understanding and close cooperation between China and
the United States is essential to the preservation of peace and
prosperity in the Pacific and throughout the world.
In the post-war period China will need American helpAmerican capital, technical aid and diplomatic backing. China
deserves our continued support, which, indeed, js in our own interest as well as hers. That she will welcome our aid is clear.
But China, proud in her new emancipation, will be quick to resent anything that smacks of the old unequal regime of recent and
bitter memory. The new China will have its ups and downs. Its
record will not be free from mistakes- any more than our own
has been. Most of all, perhaps, Americans can help China by
trying to understand the magnitude of the task which she faces
in transforming an ancient medieval society into a modern democratic nation. Only if we appreciate her difficulties as well as her
achievements can we deal fairly with China. And we must remember that many of the difficulties which she faces today and in
years to come are the result of seven years of war in which China
fought our battle almost unaided.

,..
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